Multi-dimensional change and the question of comparison

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Abstract
This article elaborates and endorses the idea of civilization as advanced by R. G. Collingwood. Particular attention is given to two of his most neglected works, The New Leviathan and “What 'Civilization' Means”. The New Leviathan was written in the context of the rise of fascist-populism and World War II. Collingwood re-conceptualized the notion of civilization and situated it in the relationship between autonomy and rationality, with both conceived as processual and each intertwined with the other. He puts “civility” at the heart of civilization. Central to his argument are the distinctions he draws between civilization and barbarism, on the one hand, and between social, economic and legal dimensions of civilization, and their protean interrelationships, on the other. Collingwood ultimately advocates a notion of civilization-as-progress that is unencumbered by utopianistic determinism or ethnocentric populism. His unique argument has important implications for comparative research.

Keywords
Civilization, barbarism, progress, rationality, agency, self-determination, liberalism

It is perhaps not surprising that how academics invoke "civilization" often varies from how it is invoked in other arenas of discourse. Scholars have, over time, pluralized the idea, so one hears of Western Civilization, Chinese Civilization, Egyptian Civilization, Mayan Civilization, Hindu Civilization, and so on. These categories lack any overt presumption that one civilization is, by comparison, superior to others, or that one is obviously appealing and acceptable and the other(s) repugnant and to be rejected, let
alone eliminated. On occasion this pluralism has penetrated aspects of public discourse too.  

Interestingly Samuel Huntington's (in)famous "clash of civilizations" and its putative counterpoint, Francis Fukuyama's "end of history", both suggest, each in their own way, that civilizations can be evaluated as better or worse. But neither construct their arguments in explicit relation to a term that scholars once proudly propagated, and which is part of the reservoir of popular, political and public discourse: barbarism.¹

In contemporary times, scholars have, on the whole, eschewed an understanding of civilization that puts it in relation to barbarism. ² The relation between civilization and barbarism has typically been seen as of two sorts. One sort sees the relation as a dichotomy: all societies can be understood as either entirely civilized or entirely barbaric. According to this view, a society could not and cannot be "almost entirely civilized, but a bit barbaric" or vice versa, any more than one can be, in how we use our language, a little bit pregnant; one either is, or is not. Moreover, civilization and barbarism are each the opposite of the other – the specific genre of opposition that points to differences in kind.

A second conception of the relation posits it as a continuum, with barbarism at one end and civilization at the other end, with all societies placed somewhere along the continuum. In nineteenth century Western thought, this idea was accompanied by evolutionism and, often, by utopianism and determinism as well. Where a society is ²

¹ Although when certain civilizations are grouped together a tacit evolutionism seems to emerge, for example when European Civilization is conflated with both Modern Civilization and Western Civilization. This civilizational assemblage implies, in turn, that, e.g., Egyptian and Chinese Civilization represent separate sorts of assemblages, namely, civilizations that are ancient or traditional. See Connolly 1999 and Jackson 2006.

² I would also add that the worlds of intellectuals and others are never hermetically sealed from each other. The idea of civilization is less explicit in Fukuyama than in Huntington but not, therefore, less pivotal in his analysis. Writing at around the same time as Fukuyama and Huntington, V. S. Naipaul (1990) is more explicit in affirming that an end-of-history argument requires supporting a progressivist view of civilization. Conversely, the sense of inexorable progress found in Fukuyama and Naipaul is less apparent in Huntington, but is discernable in his later work on immigration from the Americas to the United States of America (Huntington 2004, see also Bowden 2010). Erich Kolig (2015) echoes Huntington's concerns about civilization and immigration when he asks, essentially, how much the West can tolerate Muslim immigrants. He broadly and ultimately sees the West as "modern," "enlightened," "progressive," "liberal," "tolerant," "secular" and the home of "human rights" and of "religious and cultural freedom." This is in contrast to Islam's exceptional inclination towards a "theocentric world view" that demands adherence to a "total way of life." Kolig worries that some Islamic practices in the West could contribute to "social disintegration." He rebukes those who espouse a capacious pluralism: "[c]elebrating diversity and avoiding moral judgment is very New Age and post-modernist, but lacks in practical reason." Noting that some states are adopting increasingly strict immigration regimes he states "[s]ome spectacular cases of maladjustment of Muslims have encouraged a revision of rules relating to immigration and asylum seekers." See Kolig 2015.

placed on the continuum is an indication of the extent – the degree – to which they had evolved. How evolution was defined and measured varied widely. For some it was appraised by mastery over nature in the form of science and technology (Morgan, Raglan), for others spiritual maturity (Tylor, Toynbee), rationality (Kant), aesthetically-informed virtue (Schiller), manners (Elias, Spalding), fitness (Spencer) or complexity (Toynbee). For some (Spengler, Targowski) this evolution was and is more appropriately understood as a decline, though Oswald Spengler’s thinking later emerged in debates about the growth as well as the decline of civilizations.5

Yet ultimately popular and public discourse reminds what scholars taught – and what some scholars may still maintain albeit in muted form – namely that civilization is often understood in relation to barbarism, as civilization’s contrary.6 Particularly in the wake of shocking events such as genocide or torture or terrorist attacks (the last has provided the catalyst most frequently of late) the discourse of barbarism seems to come out of civilization’s shadow and into public light. The distinction proliferates in both its Manichean and evolutionist modes – sending scholars scattering: protesting, approving, or willfully ignoring the idea of barbarism. Among those particularly discomfited are my fellow socio-cultural anthropologists who, after first contributing to the discourse of civilization, later promulgated the notion of culture in significant measure to counter and displace it, as well to veil attendant notions such as barbarism, savagery and the primitive.7

In the new millennium, in the West, the comparison of civilization with barbarism re-emerged forcefully after the attacks on the U.S. in September 2001 (9/11). In this context President George W. Bush declared to the United Nations that the attack had not been against the United States, but against civilization itself and a civilization shared, presumably, by the (civilized) world. The contrast between civilization and barbarism emerged even more starkly with the 2015 attacks in Paris. These attacks in Paris, the City of Light and the Enlightenment, colored the distinction between civilization and barbarism with a certain hue, the light of freedom and progress versus that of darkness

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5 We should bear in mind that decline should not be equated with devolution, and neither of the two with what will be referred to below as "de-civilizing" processes. It is also worth recalling that the notion of civilization has also been counterposed to "savage" and "primitive," but the focus in this article is on civilization in relation to "barbarism." Still it may be noted that, though the term “savage” has been invoked in the contexts alluded to here, the term “primitive,” by comparison, has hardly been deployed.

6 I use "public" in the sense of Jürgen Habermas's "public sphere": see The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society, Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, see pages 30-31. See also Habermas 1992.

7 For Huntington, civilization is not in contradistinction to culture but, rather, seems to be culture-writ-large: “A civilization is the highest cultural grouping of people and the broadest cultural identity people have short of that which distinguishes humans from other species” (1993, p. 24, emphases added). For him culture, in turn, seems to be informed primarily by religion. In all this, what is most notable is that he is moving away from the long-standing position that human history is driven by the growth of rationality, whether technological or political, inductive or deductive. His use of culture – civilization as culture – is thus akin to some socio-cultural anthropologists who, often implicitly, distill the essence of culture as something that is not rational.
and destruction. These attacks, and related concerns about terrorism, migration and challenges to one's "way of life" appear to have animated those who voted in favor of Brexit.

What follows below is a preamble to a broader project of excavating and interpreting R. G. Collingwood’s arguments about what civilization and barbarism meant to him. He speaks to these in The New Leviathan or Man, Society, Civilization and Barbarism (1942) and in his "What 'Civilisation' Means," which was probably written around 1939, and which the editors of the 1999 reprint of The New Leviathan added as an appendix (pp. 480-511). Both The New Leviathan and "What 'Civilisation' Means" elaborate on the issue of barbarism and are – probably for this very reason – among the most neglected of Collingwood’s writings.

Collingwood (1889-1943) was Waynflete Professor of Metaphysical Philosophy at Magdalen College, Oxford University, from 1935 until shortly before his death. Among the most learned men of his time, he is best known for his writings on history, logic and art, as well as his work as a practicing archaeologist of the Roman Empire. Yet in his 1939 autobiography one can discern that his thinking on issues of civilization had informed almost all his work, including in what may appear as among his most abstruse philosophical arguments. For example, he saw the philosophical school of realism, which was emerging as a dominant paradigm in key philosophical circles in the years leading up to World War II, as a threat to civilization, insofar as he saw realism as undermining much of philosophy itself, including moral philosophy.

The New Leviathan is a remarkably provocative and, at times, mordantly witty tome. It is subtitled "Man, Society, Civilization, and Barbarism," and these correspond to the four parts into which the book is divided. This organization parallels Hobbes’s original Leviathan, "Man, Society, Commonwealth, Kingdom of Darkness," published in 1651. Both Leviathans were written in times of rapid change – making them, in this sense, all the more relevant today. In Collingwood’s case, he saw his work explicitly as a contribution to the war effort, i.e., against fascist populism. Collingwood supported the war against fascist populism and, in that context, saved some of his harshest criticism for British

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8 That innocents, not soldiers or combatants, were targeted in these attacks raises a perturbing problem: the French Revolution(s) propounded the idea that governments could act only if authorized to do so by the will of the people. But his, in some ways, ostensibly confounds the distinctions, moral and otherwise, between, e.g., a country’s military and its citizens, as well as raising issues of war-as-unavoidable-defense versus war-of-choice. These topics are too fraught and complex to be addressed here.

9 Defending a "way of life" is a phrase and concern Collingwood seems to endorse. Since this article was written there have been other incidents of violence perpetrated by those who purport to represent Islam: the attacks at the Belgium airport, at a Florida nightclub, on Bastille Day in France (a day given unique significance in French and indeed Western history), in Istanbul, in Bangladesh, in Turkey, Saudi Arabia and in Afghanistan. It is noteworthy that the Istanbul, Bangladesh, Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Afghanistan attacks did not generate the civilization versus barbarism distinction to the extent as in the attacks on “Western” polities. In addition, the idea that there were fatalities and injuries to innocents (see footnote 7) was less pronounced in the non-Western settings. Is this because when a Muslim majority population is attacked in the name of Islam, the line between civilization and barbarism is seen, somehow, as less bright? If civilization is plural, then is barbarism as well? See Hutton 2012 and 2013.
pacifists. He found fascist populism to be a form of barbarism, and turned to Hobbes to understand how barbarism could arise in the midst, as it seemed to him, of civilization.

Collingwood was an ardent though critical admirer of Hobbes. Like Hobbes, Collingwood grounded his theories of ethics and politics in a philosophy of mind and of rational activity. My initial aim for this article was to excavate and recuperate Collingwood's arguments about civilization and barbarism with particular attention to how his arguments illuminate the current usage of these concepts. However, I realized that an examination of his understanding of mind and consciousness—and, in particular, intentional action—must be presented first. This is because his arguments about civilization, barbarism, rationality and self-determination each and all have, as their edifice, his understanding of how human consciousness develops and operates. In my view, his approach anticipates actor-centred models in social and cultural analysis—with the added advantage that he does not avoid comparative reflections or abandon practical and ethical issues (see Braudel 1993 and Gong 1984).

Collingwood defines the process of civilization as the “asymptotic approximation to the ideal condition of civility.” Full and complete civility is a utopian ideal and, in that sense, can never be fully realized. Collingwood understands civilization to have three dimensions: social civilization, economic civilization and legal civilization. The first, social civilization, concerns how humans relate to other humans, that is, relationships between members of a polity as well as relationships between different polities. It is this dimension that is, I will argue, the most important for Collingwood, for theoretical but also ethical and practical reasons. The second dimension, economic civilization, concerns how humans relate to nature. In this dimension the advancement of science and technology is valued insofar as they allow for greater efficiency in productive enterprises that harness the attributes of nature. Economic civilization also entails intra-human relations and, in that sense, overlaps with social civilization—or, perhaps better, social civilization encompasses some of economic civilization.


11 For example, Collingwood appreciated Hobbes’s insight that human activity is collective and consensual, a conjoining of wills oriented towards some goal; from such an understanding of human collective activity—which may, in key regards, be understood as a genre of social contract theory—one can see how collective activity could also come unraveled and, at worst, work against itself. However, Collingwood disagreed with Hobbes’s argument that human nature was one of pure self-maximization and thus the only reason collectivities came into existence was to further the individual interests of its members. Hobbes’s view of human nature led him to endorse absolutism in the final analysis. Collingwood’s revision of Hobbes led him to liberal democracy.

12 In my view, his approach anticipates actor-centered models in social and cultural analysis—with the added advantage that he does not avoid comparative reflections or abandon practical and ethical issues, see Braudel 1993 and Gong 1984.

For Collingwood neither scientific production nor technological innovation is co-extensive with civilization: even a polity with civilized production and civilized exchange – thus an economically civilized collective – may lack in social civilization which, for him, trumps the other two dimensions of civilization. Social civilization is relative to a polity’s specific definition(s) of civility and barbarism, which implies that polities cannot be judged as points on a single continuum, but rather must be understood as each polity recognizes and realizes its own trajectory of social civilization in relation to economic and legal civilization.\(^{14}\)

Given this approach, a polity is only less civilized than another if it shares the same or similar ideals, or goals, of civility, but has realized these ideals to a lesser degree. It should be noted though that Collingwood is not a cultural relativist, as suggested by his rebuke of pacifism noted above; for now, we may note that his position in this regard hinges on the role that force or, conversely, consent, plays in how a collectivity comes to recognize and then realize its goals and ideals. At the heart of his notion of social civilization is the axiom that dialogue and persuasion are to be pursued over force as much as possible.

The attempt to entirely eliminate all forms of force from all social relations, including relationships between polities, is utopian, i.e., unachievable. Indeed, attempts to implement utopia almost always require a significant dose of force. For Collingwood a universal goal is to minimize force and maximize dialogue, while bearing in mind that what counts as force and dialogue will itself vary and change. Here Collingwood introduces an important distinction between ideal and fact – between what a polity is and what it strives to be – that is crucial to his critique of relativism. This will be elaborated later.

The third dimension of civilization, legal civilization, recognizes the importance of law. This can take myriad forms, including civil and criminal law. Cross-culturally, I take legal civilization to refer to the fact that persons and peoples set up something we can call "rules."\(^{15}\) Although Collingwood does not say so explicitly, rules are not the same as norms, customs, habits and routines – though rules can overlap with any of these. Rules are expressed explicitly and come with the sense that there are persons or institutions

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\(^{14}\) Norbert Elias suggests that civilization is intertwined with how different figurations of power – power in the form of violence in particular – changes over time, and gives attention to seemingly disparate areas of social life as manners and the state. Perhaps Elias was, in his earlier work, somewhat blinkered by his mentor Alfred Weber (the brother of Max Weber) in not seeing civilization as both multidimensional and contingent. See both Elias 2012 and Mennell & Goudsblom 1998. However, a full comparison between Elias and Collingwood along these lines should be undertaken before such arguments are advanced. Collingwood’s work on civilization etc. could be put in fruitful dialogue with Fevre (1973), Voegelin (1987), and Pocock (1999-2015), as well as Elias and Braudel (1993). The argument that I offer here is that, for Collingwood, a philosophy of mind must be at the center of discussions about civilization etc.

\(^{15}\) R.G. Collingwood, 2005. The New Leviathan or Man, Society, Civilization and Barbarism, (New York, New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 290-291, 502, 510. I would add that a full array of the humanities and social sciences would have to be called upon in order to understand a given polity’s definition of civilization and barbarism.
that have the recognized role of codifying and adjudicating them. The matter of enforcing rules is dealt with in the same terms as force more generally in a polity, as already alluded to above and to be detailed later.

Hence for Collingwood a key gauge of civilization is how these three dimensions of human life -- social, economic and legal -- are interpreted and interrelated (or "articulated") each with the other. His concern in the first instance is how these dimensions are related consciously and intentionally by human actors, individual or collective, in different times and places. The civilizing process involves the on-going project of better interrelating these dimensions. Each dimension is dynamic; it is not inert but always in-process, and hence the project of interrelating them is also dynamic, an on-going process. Insofar and on those occasions when a collectivity fails to recognize the difference between these aspects -- for all collectivities have them -- or fails to properly inter-relate or integrate them, such a collectivity can be seen as uncivilized or, more precisely, faltering in the civilizing process. Insofar as collectivities actively seek to obfuscate the distinctions between these dimensions, or otherwise work actively against their constructive interrelation, such activity can be called barbaric or, better, de-civilizing. As will be elaborated later it is through this model that Collingwood provides, in my view, a distinctive alembic for distilling and comparing the ideas of Mohandas (Mahatma) Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru on the content and trajectory of civilization in India.

Civilization and self-determining communities

Collingwood situates civilization also in the interrelationships between what he calls "social community" and "non-social community." For Collingwood, all collectivities are an admixture of two sorts of communities, social communities and non-social communities. The difference between the two lies in the extent that each is freely constituted and is self-governing, that is, self-determining. A social community, or what Collingwood calls "society" in its proper sense, is a self-determining community within a polity. The non-social community is likewise within a polity, but is not freely constituted and is not self-determining. The social community rules over the non-social community in the broadest sense. No polity that perdures over time is without this mixed character, whether that polity be the so-called nuclear family or a country with a population of billions. In many polities, the distinction is most obviously apparent in that made between children and adults. Typically, adults are the social community in relation to the non-social community of children. I am not aware of any collectivity that has allowed two-year-olds to be fully self-governing.

Collingwood uses the idea of non-social communities as a replacement for Hobbes's notion of the state of nature, and perpetual war of each-against-all that, for Hobbes, characterizes the state of nature. The relationship between ruler and ruled, and of rule to self-determination, is an elaboration of the idea of agency.

By rules "in the broadest sense" I mean to indicate that the social community is not just focused on the legal dimension of civilization, but on all dimensions. Moreover, “rule” here does not mean that the social community wields violence – let alone has a monopoly on it.
Collingwood's approach to civilization is founded upon his convictions about human agency, i.e., his understanding of human consciousness and human action, with particular attention to action that is explicitly intentional and, in that sense, rational. For him, the essence of self-determination is being able to freely act to shape one's life. Self-determination is founded on the ability to choose and act freely, that is, to act agentively.

A non-social community is composed of those who are not fully actualized agents. Thus, the relation of society to non-social communities is one of agents who are embarked on a joint enterprise who rule, and less-than-full agents who are ruled. There is a range or scale of more or less agentive subjects from those who do not govern at all, all the way up to those who govern themselves entirely. But all are agents of some kind and degree.

The central task of the social-community is to convert those in the non-social community so that they can join the social-community, the self-ruled. Persuasion and pedagogy are the ideal forms of rule, i.e., of conversion. If it fails, and only then, force may be legitimately used by the rulers over the ruled, as long as it serves the long-term goal of supporting the conversion of the ruled so that they can join the ranks of the rulers.

The question of civilization arises in this context for Collingwood because of the idea that, as noted, he sees the central role of a social community, that is, a ruling society, to be to reproduce and expand itself by guiding members of the non-social community into the social community. This is the quintessential civilizing process. A society that is failing to turn non-social community into social community is failing at civilizing. A social community that actively resists its own expansion is de-civilizing, it is behaving barbarically. We know that in many polities there are social communities that are treated as non-social communities. They are, at best, represented as if they are children – on the egregious grounds of perceived difference, e.g., in ethnicity, gender, and religious or political beliefs. A collectivity that in its external relations treats another social community as if it is a non-social community is also behaving barbarically, and inciting war.

Crucial to the conversion of non-social community to social community is the ability of the social community, the society, to integrate the social, economic and legal dimensions of civilization. To reiterate, for Collingwood, a polity is civilized, or civilizing, to the extent that it promotes self-determination within itself, with regard to both individuals and sub-groups. For this to proceed successfully, the interrelations between the three dimensions must be monitored and maximized, for all three are necessary to learning the arts of self-determination. Yet this immediately raises questions. What counts as agency? And what if, as is too often the case, one individual's or polity's choices are counter to those of others?

Below, I adumbrate the understanding of human nature and human being that underpins Collingwood's answers to these questions, and which underwrites his advocacy for civilization. I select those aspects of *The New Leviathan* that are most relevant to the broader discussion of what I will call "civilizing action" and "barbarizing action," a distinction that has been pointed to above, and will be re-visited in what it is to follow.
Collingwood’s *New Leviathan* follows the format of Hobbes’s *Leviathan* in that it is enumerated and organized with sub-points etc. When citing Collingwood, I will use this format, with brackets.

The discussion below draws exclusively on Part I of *The New Leviathan*, entitled "On Man."\(^{17}\)

Discourse is the activity by which a man seeks to mean anything, such as through the production of a flow of sounds and silences \([NL.6.1-6.19]\) Note that discourse is not a tool but an activity. It is not a thing, but rather an “-ing”; not a hammer, but hammering.

Language is an abstraction from discourse: it is the system adopted, the means employed, the rules followed in the activity of discourse. Language is not a tool whereby knowledge already existing in one man's mind is communicated to another's, but an activity prior to knowledge itself, without which knowledge could never come into existence. As consciousness develops, language develops with it \([6.11,6.18,6.41]\). For Collingwood the recognition that language precedes thought is one of Hobbes's greatest contributions \([6.43]\).

Language in its simplest form is the language of consciousness in its simplest form; the mere register of feelings, irrational, unplanned, unorganized – what we may, at some risk, call “sensation” or “experience.” At this level of consciousness, thought is merely apprehensive, capable of taking what is "given" to it \([6.58,10.51]\). When consciousness becomes conceptual thought, language is used to develop abstract terms. Here consciousness is capable of abstracting from what is given \([6.12, 6.17, 6.58]\). When consciousness becomes propositional thought, discourse develops the propositional sentence. Here consciousness begins to distinguish truth from error \([6.59, 10.51]\). Consciousness becomes reason as language begins to link one propositional sentence with another, so as to demonstrate that the later statements are consequences of the former. At this level of consciousness the agent is also capable of understanding himself in relation to other things \([6.59, 10.51]\).

Conceptual thinking is an act of practical consciousness by which a person emerges from a simple state of sensation and feeling. Persons make themselves conscious of their sensations and feelings by naming them, either by gesture (e.g., a shiver) or in speech (e.g., saying "I'm cold") \([6.2,6.28]\). With selective attention a person can focus on and name a particular sensation or feeling from amongst a mass of them. This selective attention changes both the person attending and the object attended to (the distinct feeling selected out for attention) because it changes the nature of the "field" of feeling \([7.23,7.24]\). The act of classifying is a practical activity of consciousness which "draws the line" between various (selected) "objects" in the field of sensation and feeling, for example, the point at which one decides to stop calling a color red and start calling it purple, or decides to draw a line between genders.

\(^{17}\)Although the formal mathematical layout of the *New Leviathan* parallels that of Hobbes’s *Leviathan*, David Boucher, a scholar who specializes in the links between British idealism and liberalism, argues that Collingwood follows the Bible instead (Boucher 2003, pages 122-136).
Thus, all classes, i.e., cognitive classifications and categories, are founded in practical activity on the part of the individual and are negotiated in the mutual practical activity of various individuals. The members of a class become a member of that class through their resemblance, a resemblance of both kind and degree, a resemblance determined (and perhaps established) through the practical consciousness of the classifier [19.22-19.35]. This point is central in Collingwood's reformulation of the notion of "society" – in relation to social and non-social communities, as outlined above – and, in turn, of "civilization" and "barbarism".

Let's say a person is conscious of an object, and then has a consciousness of that initial consciousness. The latter consciousness makes the initial consciousness a first order object [5.26]. A proposition is never about such a first order object [11.34] but about a concept [11.35]. Because propositions are about concepts, any proposition may be mistaken and hence it is contestable [11.35] – which means it can be reassessed and re-proposed. In other words, propositional consciousness involves the asking and answering of questions, and asking a question implies contemplating alternatives [11.12].

Here I would point out that these various levels of consciousness are closely connected with Collingwood's notion of rational action and of agency – and the difference between the two. Pretty much any level of consciousness can be associated with action. If I stub my toe and say "ouch" that is an action. If I act on an appetite or a desire that is certainly also an action. But agency is a particular form of action that requires a unique mode of consciousness. Indeed, if consciousness is always more or less some sort of activity (for body and mind are not disjoined), it is in agency that consciousness and action come together utterly. Still, there are different forms of action that accompany different forms of consciousness. They not only differ in kind but also in degree. There is, then, some measure of agency in all action. Yet agency exists unquestionably when action is exercised with the consciousness of choice [emphasis added, cf. Section 13 of Part I].

Consciousness of choice has two preconditions. First, choice entails reflective thought. Reflective thought requires the movement to a "higher" level of consciousness of/from a "lower" level of consciousness, for no form of consciousness is aware of itself as a form of consciousness. Thus, if one is acting merely on the basis of the "desire" level of consciousness, one is not reflecting on that desire. As one moves through higher and higher levels of consciousness, through making the previous level of consciousness the object of the subsequent level, one becomes increasingly reflective, or, in other words, one has something to be reflective "about." When this reflective action is the outcome of deliberation within a society, no position can be posited as such, i.e., as stable. Through the process of the collective conscious, refinement, desires, feelings, emotions are not disavowed, rather they are elaborated, processed reflectively, in new figurations of language and action.

At higher levels of consciousness propositions, abstraction and indeed rationality develop. Rational thinking begins when a man accustomed to propositional thinking starts making a distinction that is not entailed in propositional thinking: the distinction
between "the that" and "the why" [14.1-14.2]. And with rationality arrives the ability to choose. One can choose without being rational, that is, without being aware of the reason for one’s choice. This is capricious agency. But if one has reflected enough to be conscious of one's reason for choosing, then this is agency par excellence. Here consciousness is will, and free will at that. Agency, therefore, describes the actualized capacity for persons to be able to (when they are able to) act freely, wilfully and rationally in the world.

Human beings exist in association with other human beings. Human agency, therefore, always involves interaction with other agents [Ibid.: 23]. If we look for an individual acting in the world according to his or her own discrete determinate nature, a nature that has come to exist without any interaction with other agents, we will not find one. The saying that no human being is "an island" is inspiring in myriad ways. It is also a physical, biological, psychological and social fact. Accordingly, to exist in society is to participate with other agents in an enterprise: "every society is formed for the joint prosecution of some exercise" [21.95]. Two or more agents who come together can constitute a society. They would embark – ideally with maximum and mutual consent – on some enterprise. The process that allows a person to say, "I will" is the same that allows a person to say, "we will." Thus society, properly speaking, involves the pursuit of common activity by agents who are free to choose that activity. Even planning and going for a walk with someone is to engage in society, albeit a relatively temporary one.

It is crucial to recall the distinction between society and class respectively [19.37 passim]. A class is a group of things united because of their resemblance, their sharing of some common attribute(s); the creation of a class, i.e., discerning the common attributes are is a practical act of some agent's consciousness (individual or collective agent) as noted above. For Collingwood, however, a society is not a group of people brought together because of some attribute, however striking, they possess that makes them resemble each other. A society is a constituted when two or more agents together embark – ideally with maximal and mutual consent, as noted above – on some practical enterprise. True, once a society comes into existence, all the members represent at least one class, share at least one attribute, namely the class of all who belong to that society! However (the class of) belonging to a society as assessed by "external" criteria never creates the society, rather the reverse: the class comes into existence as a consequence of the practical activities of agents. According to Collingwood, the notion of class is often mistaken as a notion of society. In fact, “class” masks the empirical complexity of agents.

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18 Collingwood describes and analyzes three kinds of reason -- utility, right and duty -- in sections 15, 16 and 17 of Part I of The New Leviathan.

19 This capacity includes and, in some cases, requires the ability to use symbols and signs, but the capacity is not limited to symbols and signs as some socio-cultural anthropologists would have it. One of my central interests in civilizational analyses is that they could allow for bringing the insights of political philosophy, particularly its attention to rationality, into conversation with key strands in socio-cultural anthropology, not least the concept of culture itself.

20 Here “society” means “social-community.”
by treating them as if they were unitary, determinate objects, the manifestations of some underlying essence or the product of some substantialized agent, a pure class of persons who share some permanent "something" despite their actual (dis)organization at any one time or, conversely, perhaps their unobserved unity of purpose.

In any case, society is nothing over and above its members. It is the on-going will and protean activity of its members, which recursively re-shapes itself in relation to both internal and external factors [21.27]. This applies not only in the first instance when society is formed, but also throughout its duration: society is on-going activity. When the activity ceases the society ceases. In this, Collingwood distinguishes himself from most social theorists. The latter see society as the more or less permanent product of a singular move away from nature. Thus, for anthropologist Claude Levi-Strauss the moment of the first exchange (of a woman, or a word) creates a social over against a natural distinction, and society is born in that single stroke. For Hobbes, too, the move from the state of nature to society is established and completed with the creation of the Leviathan.

Not so for Collingwood. He suggests that to see society as a stable entity is to fail to recognize that it is actually the ongoing activity of agents. Hobbes made this mistake when he reified the body politic into a thing that exists like the body, which, in Hobbes's view, was like that of a self-sustaining machine. For him once society is constituted it operates in terms of principles and laws of its own; the members of society are no longer agents consciously participating in a joint enterprise but are now mere components of the system. Boucher [1989:77 passim] says that, for Collingwood, both Hobbes and René Descartes contributed greatly to understanding how humans relate to the natural world and also how humans relate to other humans. One contributed by emphasizing the radically subjective basis of action, the other the same for thought. However, both failed to move beyond this one-sided subjectivism which separated subject from object. To Hobbes Collingwood says: action is subjective no doubt, but it is also an elaboration of how actions relate to each other, whether the diverse actions of a single subject in relation to the other, or the diverse actions of other subjects. To Descartes Collingwood says: thought is subjective too, but all thought elaborates on how the body exists in the world. In fact, the subject itself is created by reflection on bodily sensation, feeling, appetite, desire etc., not a transcendental rationalism that constitutes the subject out of thin air. Accordingly, all conscious action is ultimately borne of what may be loosely called “experience.”

Moreover, experience is ongoing. It doesn't end after some singular and definitive move from nature to society. Such a view assumes that after an original moment of consciousness (e.g., prudential reason in Hobbes's case) society is created and nature disappears, in the sense that it is no longer the baseline from which society moves away in constituting itself. For Collingwood, the relationship between the state of nature and the state of society is in flux, to the point that it can be difficult to separate the two at all, let alone once and for all. In this sense, experience is un-ending and incomplete, and thus so, too, is consciousness. Accordingly, the move from nature to society is an on-going and dynamic activity of agents, for this is, after all, the very definition of society: the continuous reiteration or re-invention of agents participating in joint enterprises.
To have agency does not mean that one is fully conscious of every aspect of one's actions and its consequences. Nor does it mean that one can create one's reality as one chooses. As noted above with regard to ethnicity, gender etc., agents can be both the patients and the instruments of the agency of others. Many critiques of nineteenth century colonialism and of post-World War II global order show how societies seek to turn other societies, both internal and external, into non-social communities – although not presenting the critique in these Collingwoodian terms (see Jackson 2006).

For Collingwood, civilization or barbarism is to be found precisely in the relations between non-social communities and social communities. Is the latter, the ruling group, using their rule to recruit members of non-social communities into becoming members of the ruling society? Does the social community see the distinctions between social, economic and legal civilization, and the on-going and protean challenge of articulating each with the other? Does the ruling society encourage its members, especially new ones, to dissent and offer other visions of this articulation? If the answers are yes, then this is a civilizing polity.

Relations between agents can involve either dialogue (discussed above as persuasion) or domination (discussed above as force). In dialogue one tries to find a position in which both sides can come to agree, where each can see the partial accuracy of their own and others' views. Here Collingwood evinces his Hegelian heritage, for it was Hegel who enunciated the principle that concepts can never be set in resolute opposition for they will always find a higher synthesis. For Collingwood, however, this dialectical process is not exemplary of a predetermined unfolding process of universal rationality, but of the negotiations of historically-situated agents. Agents can interact through domination as well, where one party seeks to force the other to relinquish its agency. Indeed, if one agrees with Collingwood here, one might say that overt domination is a sign of weakness: if you cannot persuade, you trot out the troops.

A social community maintains its non-social community in that position either via dialogue or by domination. Collingwood says that the latter may be maintained by "order" or by the inculcation of particular "ways of life" [21.3]. In any case the non-social community is not allowed to exercise its will. But this is not to indicate that there is a fundamental and essential difference in kind (only) between social and non-social aspects of a community.

Hence, agents are always overlapping classes: a unique notion of social “system” which makes agency central: it assumes systems of this sort are made and not simply found and that they are continually being completed, contested and remade. This is a different notion of system from those notions of the natural world – which are then often projected onto the human world. In the taxonomic discourse of natural science, systems are conceived to be composed of mutually and yet interdependent parts; but a construction such as this immediately raises the question of which part is more fundamental or more important. Typically, some transcendent principle of unity, perhaps one part elevated over the rest, was posited to deal with this dilemma, leading to essentialism.
In contrast to taxonomy, for Collingwood, "the world of politics is a dialectical world in which non-social communities (communities of men in what Hobbes called the "state of nature") turn into "societies" [24.71]. This view of human affairs as processual is not a view that human activity lacks order. It is, more precisely, a different view of order. This is a vision of society as polity where, for the ruling society in particular, the work is never done [25.23]. From this vantage, what some today see as fragments of culture – fragments to be lamented or celebrated – are perhaps better seen as consequences of a ruling society that does not acknowledge its role and responsibility as such, or has knowingly abdicated it (see Ghosh 2016, 2007). If the latter, and per above, such actions could be characterized as barbaric.

The task of Part II of my undertaking is to show that Collingwood’s approach to civilization and barbarism provides a framework for comparing civilizational projects. The specific aim will be to use his framework to juxtapose what Mahatma Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru, respectively, envisioned as the civilizing and de-civilizing aspects of Indian civilization.

For example, Collingwood and Gandhi seem to share the understanding that civilization is a process (like "socialization") and, moreover, an incremental process – unlike the radical, revolutionary, "Great Leap Forward" of Nehru's Planning Commissions. Arguably Elias (2012) provides a middle-ground between these two visions of civilizational change – incremental versus revolutionary – in that he saw the civilizing process as incremental, but underscored that de-civilizing processes could occur with great rapidity.

A striking difference between Collingwood and Gandhi is that, from a Collingwoodian perspective, Gandhi did not fully grasp the economic dimension of Indian civilization, and thus could not interrelate it with the other dimensions in a sustainable manner. It is important to note that though Collingwood held that all people and peoples have these three dimensions – social, economic, and legal – as aspects of their existence, the kind and degree of civilization in these dimensions is variable, i.e., "having" a dimension does not therefore mean that progress (civilization) is occurring in that dimension. Accordingly, as we will see in the subsequent article, Collingwood draws an important distinction between "wealth" and "riches." The distinction allows him to locate the appropriate place of economic exchange, including capitalist free markets, in civilizational pursuits. The distinction between "wealth" and "riches" is one that Gandhi failed to draw, I argue. Significantly, the distinction between wealth and riches also allows us to reconsider how factors such as public works, monumental architecture, occupational specialization and state administration (including considerations of "core" versus "periphery") should be understood in relation to the idea of civilization, and thereby proffers a unique perspective on Gandhi’s insistence that the heart of Indian civilization was to be found in its rural agricultural villages.

Another key point of comparison between Collingwood, Gandhi and Nehru will be the use of force versus dialogue as a key criterion for judging how well the three...
dimensions of civilization – social, economic and legal – are integrated. The perfect and ultimate integration of these three, where full civility is exhibited on all occasions, is impossible. That is a utopian ideal, as noted above. This does not mean, however, that universal civility should not orient our civilizational pursuits. It is in this sense that Collingwood suggests that some notion of universal civilization is defensible – not in the sense of material achievements (buildings or banking systems) or high-cultural ones (ballets or ragas) but a vigilant attitude and aspiration with regard to intra-human relations, and how these relations articulate with other relations, such as the means of production. Collingwood calls for incremental changes that, yet, have an eye on the horizon of possibility. But this very incrementalism curtails any person’s or polity’s claim to have a complete and concrete picture of what that horizon will hold.

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WORKS CONSULTED


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